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In cases of personal injury resulting in the loss to a household of
an individual who produces non-monetary income, there is a need to
assess damages, just as in cases resulting in the loss of money income.
Household services are a large component of non-monetary income. The
money value of services in the home constitutes an appropriate item
of damages. This gives rise to an issue of valuation: how is one to measure
the value of lost household services? The aim of this paper is to examine
several of the methods used in valuing household services in order to
determine whether these methods are consistent with the legal principle
behind compensation in tort. It is shown that the most commonly used
method of calculating compensation, the replacement cost method, is
unsatisfactory and may lead to significant biases. The paper presents
a simple economic model of home production, which illustrates the most
appropriate measure of compensation. The paper emphasizes that, al-
though household production has been studied extensively, a serious
question regarding the appropriate measure of compensation remains.
I1. THE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE LEGAL RULE OF
COMPENSATION
In Canada, the right to sue for damages for the loss of household
services was established by the Supreme Court in 1885 in St Lawrence
and Ottawa Railway Co. v. Lett., In that case, Chief Justice Ritcher said:
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I cannot think [that] the injury ... ought to be confined to a pecuniary interest
in a sense so limited as only to embrace loss of money or property, but that,
as in the case of a husband in reference to the loss of a wife, so, in the case
of children, the loss of a mother may involve many things which may be regarded
as of a pecuniary character.... 2
I must confess myself at a loss to understand how it can be said that the
care and management of a household... and [the] bringing up by a worthy loving
mother of a family of children is not a substantial benefit to the husband and
children; or how it can be said that the loss of such a wife and mother is not
a substantial injury but merely sentimental, is, to my mind, incomprehensible .... 3
The evidence in this case shows that the husband was receiving benefits and
advantages from the services of his wife capable of pecuniary computation, and
had such reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of
such services by the continuance of the wife's life as would entitle him to
damages....4
The case thus established the principle that surviving family members
are entitled to compensation for the loss of household services previously
performed by the deceased person. In such cases5 the surviving family
suffers a loss of household production resulting in a decrement in their
economic welfare. It is this welfare loss that is compensated by an award
of damages.
In the past, the common law did not allow surviving family members
to sue for any losses. All claims died with the victim; but since then,
the right of survivors to sue for damages has been granted by legislation.6
Recovery for the loss of household production will fall under a 'loss
to survivors' approach.7 Compensation based on a 'loss to survivors'
approach is more sensible because it assesses the loss from the perspective
of the household - it recognizes the loss of non-monetary income that
the household originally enjoyed and would have continued to enjoy
if the victim had not died. The courts recognize that this loss of welfare
is similar to the loss of welfare arising from the inability, through death
2 IbM at 426.
3 Ibd. at 435.
4 Ibid at 436.
5 See, for example, Vana v. Tosta (1967), [1968] S.C.R 71, 66 D.L.R (2d) 97; and Ponyicky
v. Sawayama (1943), [1943] S.C.1R 197, 2 D.L.R. 545.
6 See, for example, An Act for Compensating the Families of Persons illed by Accidents, 1846
(U.K.), 9 Vic., c. 93; An Act to Revise the Family Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1986, c. 4, s. 61(1);
Family Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 120, ss 2-3(1).
7 J. Fleming, Jr., "Damages in Accident Cases" (1956) 41 Cornell LQ. 582 at 611-14. The
alternative, called the "loss to estate" approach, analyses the loss from the perspective of the victim.
This approach suffers from substantial problems: (I) the problem in attempting to value a human
life, with the victim's representative demanding infinite compensation; and (2) in cases of instantaneous
death where the victim suffered no pain, had no history of labour force participation, and not
showed no signs of entering the labour force in the future, the loss could go uncompensated.
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or injury, of a family member to earn money income. The rationale
for compensation and the measure for damage awards should therefore
be one and the same.
Judicial decisions attempt to measure this welfare loss in a manner
consistent with the purpose of tort law. Tort law enables a victim who
has been wronged to seek redress from the tort-feasor for the losses
suffered. The purpose of tort law is to restore an injured party to the
same level of welfare that he or she enjoyed before being injured. In
a well-known statement of law, Lord Blackburn said that
where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money
to be given ... you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which
will put the person who has been injured ... in the same position as he would
have been in if he had not sustained the wrong .... 8
Similarly, eminent scholars of law have always maintained that the rule
of compensation is to restore the original position of the victim - restitutio
in integrum - so far as it can be done. For example, Professor James
Fleming Jr. wrote that
[tihe principle of compensation is a natural enough corollary of the fault
principle. If [the] defendant is a wrongdoer and he is to pay damages to an innocent
plaintiff, it seems eminently fair that these damages should (at least) put the plaintiff,
as nearly as may be, in the same position he would have been in if the defendant's
wrong had not injured him.9
Professor Neil Komesar argues that this rule necessarily encompasses
a loss of household services:
Should the destruction of the driver and loss of his or her services be treated
differently?
These chattels are inputs into the household processes which produce the
ultimate pleasure and well-being of the household. The loss to the household is
the decrease in its ability to produce the same state of welfare associated with
the original state of these chattels.10
In sum, the legal rule of compensation is to award an amount that would
leave the injured party in the same position as if the accident had not
occurred. This rule of compensation can best be applied with the aid
of economic theory. Stated in economic terms, the rule calls for an award
of damages that would restore the welfare of the injured party to its
original level.
8 Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Company (1880), 5 App. Cas. 25, 42 L.T. 335 (H.L.).
9 Supra, note 7 at 583.
10 N.K. Komesar, "Toward a General Theory of Personal Injury Loss" (1974) 3 J. Leg. Stud.
457 at 466.
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It is, perhaps, disappointing to observe that this rule of compensation
is not always properly applied. This may be due to the considerable
difficulty of applying the rule accurately. However, a more fundamental
cause is a conceptual misperception regarding the actual loss. Existing
methods of measuring welfare loss, such as the replacement cost method,
opportunity cost method, or other variants, do not measure the loss in
a manner consistent with the principle behind compensation in tort.
III. CURRENT LEGAL METHODS OF CALCULATING
COMPENSATION
Measurements for legal purposes of the loss to a household resulting
from the death or injury of a person providing household services
essentially borrow from the economic literature on the valuation of
household production. The law generally follows one of three approaches.
The replacement cost approach, by far the most common, measures the
cost of replacing the services provided by the deceased to the household."
Less frequently, courts resort to the opportunity cost approach, which
measures the wages foregone by the decedent while performing household
services.' 2 Occasionally, reliance is also placed upon valuations by jurors
and testimony by so-called expert witnesses.' 3
A. The Replacement Cost Approach
Canadian and American courts have consistently adopted the re-
placement cost method in order to value lost household services. There
are two variations of the replacement cost method. The first, known
as the itemized services approach, applies the market wage rate for
comparable services to the average amount of time devoted to different
household services. The total value of household production is then taken
to be the sum of the hours devoted to meal preparation multiplied by
the market wage rate of a cook; the hours devoted to cleaning multiplied
by the market wage rate of a cleaning lady; and the respective hours
taken up by other tasks, each multiplied by the wages commanded by
11 See, for example, H. Rosen, "The Monetary Value of a Housewife: A Replacement Cost
Approach" (1974) 33 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 65 at 68; C.S. Pyun, "The Monetary Value of a Housewife:
An Economic Analysis for Use in Litigation" (1969) 28 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 271; Statistics Canada,
Office of the Senior Advisor on Integration, Estimating the Value of Household Work in Canada,
1971 by 0. Hawrylyshyn (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 1978).
12 See, for example, Komesar, supra, note 10; FJ. Pottick, "Tort Damages for the Injured
Homemaker. Opportunity Cost or Replacement Cost" (1978) 50 U. Col. L. Rev. 59; R.A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law (Toronto: Little, Brown, 1977) c. 7.
13 Pottick, bid
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people who hire themselves out to do those sorts of jobs. Proponents
of this method argued that, although some household tasks do not have
close market substitutes, most do, and approximations can usually be
made for the rest.
The second variation, known as the substitute-homemaker approach,
evaluates what it would cost to replace all household services by hiring
a single housekeeper. Rather than assuming that different tasks would
be done by cooks, babysitters, accountants, chauffeurs, commercial
cleaning services, and the like, who, it is sometimes argued, would demand
premium wages to work the intermittent hours of most household
production; this approach makes the more realistic assumption that all
of the work would be done by a single individual. With either variation
of the replacement cost method, the court will determine the appropriate
time period over which the replacement would be required, taking into
account mitigating factors such as the potential for remarriage, prob-
abilities of divorce, and life expectancies.
There are a number of conceptual and practical problems associated
with either variation of the replacement cost method. Both versions
mistakenly assume that quality and efficiency are invariant; the market
wage rate may therefore either over or underestimate the actual value
of the household services provided.14 However, a more serious objection
to the use of replacement wages is that these sums will almost certainly
overstate how much households are willing to pay for, and thus how
much they value, the time devoted to these services at the margin. If
households were required to pay the going wage for the performance
of household services, their consumption of these services would be greatly
reduced.
It should also be pointed out that many household services do not
require the associated degree of education or skill of a market equivalent
and that few homemakers would spend the same amount of time at
the job as the first variation of the replacement cost method would seem
to indicate. The result is that, more often than not, a figure based on
these methods is inflated. The fact that households rejected these market
replacements in the first place would seem to indicate that either
households find the differences in efficiency and quality wanting or that
the price of market replacements is too high relative to the households'
perception of their value.
14 E. Quah, "Persistent Problems in Measuring Household Production" (1986) 45 Am. J. Econ.
& Soc. 235.
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B. The Opportunity Cost Approach
The opportunity cost method measures the value of household
production in terms of the wages foregone when time is given to producing
household services rather than earning money income from paid em-
ployment outside the home. The presumption is that time is allocated
to household production rather than to earning money income because
the household values the benefits from household production more than
the money that could have been earned outside the home. The opportunity
cost is thus a measure, arguably a lower-bound measure, of the value
of household production. However, with the occasional exception of British
courts, the idea of valuing a household's welfare from household pro-
duction in terms of foregone wages has not been accepted.
There are a number of practical problems that may arise in the
application of this measure. For instance, the assessment of the wage
rate foregone is complicated if the deceased person did not sell any
of his or her services in the labour market. This problem is particularly
acute with deceased persons who had been out of the employment market
for a long time and had little in the way of marketable skills.
Another problem concerns the institutional constraints dictating the
length of work weeks (such as forty or forty-four hours per week), thereby
introducing a large element of 'lumpiness' into the options facing
individuals. Because of this, it is uncertain how many of the hours devoted
to household production are valued more than the outside hourly wage
and how many are not. The courts therefore consider the measurement
of potential money contribution to the household to be overly speculative
and are unwilling to accept such a probabilistic estimate.
Furthermore, the approach is criticized because it implies that a
more highly educated person is a better spouse or parent and that, as
such, the household should be awarded greater damages for their loss.
It may be that the amount of foregone money income has no correlation
to the quality of household production.
A more serious problem is that the measure derived does not reflect
the amount of welfare derived from household production. Although the
method may reveal the opportunity cost of the time spent in home
production, it does not reveal the amount of welfare that the household
derives from such production; the latter is the amount of total benefits
less total opportunity costs. This is the net-value measure of household
production. Since the rule of compensation is to restore lost welfare,
damage awards based on the opportunity cost method will be inaccurate.
Whatever other reasons the courts may have for rejecting the opportunity
cost method of compensation are reinforced by this discrepancy between
opportunity cost and the net value of household production.
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C. Other Variations: Claims of Household's, Jury Assessments, and the
Use of Expert Witnesses
Seldom will courts accept testimony from the family and friends
of the deceased regarding their valuation of the loss of household
production.' 5 This method of compensation is rarely accepted and strongly
discouraged because of the inherent unreliability of such testimony and
its prejudicial effect on the jury.
Similarly, it is uncommon to allow the jury to determine the amount
of compensation necessary to restore the welfare originally enjoyed by
the household.' 6 This method, known as 'presumption', assumes that
housework has value and that jury members, having had experience in
performing housework, would be in the best position to assess that value.
The method is purely speculative - like jury assessments of compensation
for pain and suffering. It offers no convincing justification for the accuracy
of the assessment of the welfare loss.
The use of economists, home economists, actuaries, and statisticians
- the so-called expert witnesses - to provide testimony regarding the
valuation question has and continues to become increasingly common
in tort actions.' 7 Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was, said in Lewis v.
Todd that
the award of damages is not simply an exercise in mathematics which a Judge
indulges in, leading to a 'correct' global figure. The evidence of actuaries and
economists is of value in arriving at a fair and just result. ... If the Courts are
to apply basic principles of the law of damages, and seek to achieve a reasonable
approximation to pecuniary restitutio in integrum expert assistance is vital.'
8
Similarly, in Merrill v. United Air Lines Inc., the Court stated: "As
knowledge becomes more professionalized, specialists will more fre-
quently be called upon as expert witnesses. This is the judicial by-product
of an age of pervasive technology and expanding social sciences."' 9 The
15 Pottick, supra, note 12.
16 Ibid.
17 In the past, expert testimony was not readily accepted, and some courts have held it in
error to admit such testimony on the theory that the determination of the value is a matter of
common knowledge and experience that should be left to the judge and jury. Other courts have
taken the view that expert testimony is too controversial, since the courts will have to determine
which expert testimony to follow. For instance, is the testimony from an economist more relevant
and correct than the testimonies of home economists and directors of employment agencies? On
this, see C.J. Peck & W.J. Hopkins, "Economics and Impaired Earning Capacity in Personal Injury
Cases" (1969) 44 Wash. L. Rev. 351.
18 (1980), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 694 at 708, 115 D.L.R. (3d) 257 at 267.
19 177 F. Supp. 704, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), cited in L.M. O'Connor & R.E. Miller, "The
Economist-Statistician: A Source of Expert Guidance in Determining Damages" (1972) 48 Notre
Dame Law. 354 at 357.
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point is made succinctly by Professors Leo O'Connor and Robert Miller:
"One purpose of using an economist-statistician is to assist a court and
jury in determining the true economic losses sustained .... The economist-
statistician's opinion stands or falls not on the resultant dollar computations
but on the convincing explanation of the basis for his calculations." 20
Expert testimony may aid a court in arriving at a fair and appropriate
amount for compensation, but the conceptual basis upon which the
calculations depend are quite often in error. The error lies in the use
of methods which are inappropriate for measurements of welfare and
welfare changes. For example, in Franco v. Woolfe,21 one of the expert
witnesses, Oli Hawrylyshyn, a professor of economics at Queen's Uni-
versity, testified that the value of household production is an imputed
replacement cost estimate for the country's gross national product. Apart
from the problems discussed earlier with the replacement cost method,
this approach makes a serious error in failing to distinguish between
the objective of measuring the gross national product and the objective
of measuring household welfare. Procedures appropriate for the former
are not necessarily appropriate for the latter. The method suggested by
Hawrylyshyn is therefore inappropriate.
IV. VALUATION AND COMPENSATION CONSISTENT WITH
ECONOMIC THEORY
The problem with valuing household production is that it occurs
outside the market; it is not purchased and, hence, there are no prices
to indicate the value of such outputs at the margin. Valuations are therefore
dependent on indirect measures of value. The fact that household
production is an extra-market activity does not imply that the goods
and services produced are valueless. Households clearly value them and
demonstrate this by their willingness to give up other goods and services
in order to enjoy the benefits of household production.
The issue is not whether household production has value or not,
but rather the appropriate method of valuation. The appropriate method
will in turn depend critically on the purpose of the valuation: whether
it is for national income accounting, matrimonial property settlements,
or valuation for compensation. This question of purpose has been seriously
neglected by most researchers. Depending on the purpose of valuation,
the appropriate measure would involve marginal, total, or net valuation.22
20 O'Connor & Miller, ibWd at 357.
21 (1976) 69 D.L.R. (3d), 501 6 O.R. (2d) 277 (Ont. C.A.).
22 See Quah, supra, note 14.
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Thus, if the valuation is for national income accounting, then, in order
to be consistent with the measurements of marketed outputs, market
prices, or the values at the margin, are the appropriate measure. On
the other hand, if the purpose of measurement is compensation for welfare
loss, as it is in tort litigation, then it is the measurement of net value
that is appropriate - for the objective of compensation is to return the
injured party to its original welfare position, enjoyed prior to the accident.
Household production is usually seen to be of great importance to
the welfare of households - even essential, given that food requires
preparation, children (if there are any) require care, and some minimal
level of cleanliness is necessary in order to maintain physical well-being.
Household production is, after all, the creation of goods and services
by household members for their own benefit. Yet, although households
undoubtedly receive a benefit from household production, the amount
of benefit will likely decline as production increases. There are diminishing
welfare returns from household production. Households will cease to
produce household services at the point at which the benefit from the
last hour of production just equals the opportunity cost of production.
At this point, the welfare returns from any further production would
be outweighed by the opportunity costs; but up until this point, the benefits
exceed costs.
The notion of consumer's surplus is that people value the aggregate
of the goods that they purchase by some amount in excess of what they
actually pay for them in market exchanges. This is to say, up until the
last unit purchased - the marginal unit - consumers would be willing
to pay an amount in excess, and often far in excess, of the market price.
The difference between the cost and the benefit received from infra-
marginal units allows consumers to enjoy a surplus from the exchange -
they obtain something by paying only a portion of what they would
be willing to sacrifice for it. This surplus amount is, to the consumer,
a gain from the exchange; these gains are appropriately termed 'welfare
measures in consumption'. Similarly, on the production side, the notion
of producer's surplus is that producers would be willing to supply infra-
marginal units of goods at less than market prices; but because all units
are sold at the established market price, producers are said to gain from
the exchange. These gains are appropriately termed 'welfare measures
in production'.
Household production is peculiar because households themselves both
produce and consume the goods and services. The measure of household
welfare derived from home services is therefore the sum of the consumer
and producer surpluses. This sum of economic surpluses is the net value
measurement from household production. Since what is involved in the
1986]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
death or injury of a person providing household services is the degree
to which family welfare is affected, the appropriate measure for com-
pensation is the amount required to restore the household's net value
position to the level it was at prior to the accident.
Consider Figure 1, below, which shows the marginal benefit (MB)
and marginal opportunity cost (MOc) curves (assumed here, for con-







0 J R N Hours of Household Production
Figure 1
The declining marginal benefit indicates that, for most households, at
least some level of household services are important, but successive
quantities are less important. At point N, nothing could be gained by
devoting an additional unit of time to household production. The marginal
opportunity cost curve has a positive slope indicating that opportunity
costs rise as more time is employed in household production. For most
households, the marginal opportunity costs are likely to be relatively
small for some limited allocations of time to household production and
may even be zero or negative for some very small allocations of time
(oJ); but marginal opportunity costs would probably increase with larger
commitments. The rise in marginal opportunity costs occurs as members
of the household with greater and greater potential earnings allocate
their time to household production rather than money-producing activity.
A household facing marginal costs and marginal benefits as indicated
[VOL 24 No. 3
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in Figure 1 would devote OR hours to household production. For by
devoting OR hours to home production, the welfare of the household
is maximized. At this point, marginal opportunity costs are equal to w1,
and the replacement wage rate is equal to W2.
The correct measure of a family's welfare in household production
is, as argued earlier, the net-value measurement. In Figure 1, this is shown
as the amount OVPJ. In contrast, the replacement cost measure will take
OW2SR to be the welfare estimate; this is an overestimation if a < b
+ c, or an underestimation if a > b + c, where a = W2VQ, b = QsP,
c = JPR, and d = W1W2QP. The opportunity cost measure will take OWPR
to be the correct estimate; this is an overestimation if c > d + a, or
an underestimation if c < d + a. The replacement cost measure exceeds
the opportunity cost measure by the amount d + b.
Assuming that the family member who normally provides all of
the household services is killed or completely disabled by an accident
and that no other household member can perform the services due to
other constraints, then it is clear from Figure 1 that OR hours of previously
performed household services are lost. The household's marginal cost
curve is, in effect, vertical and equal to ov. The amount of compensation
required is simply OVPJ - the amount of net benefits lost. The amount
OVPJ, when paid to the family, returns their level of welfare to the level
enjoyed before the accident.
This same analysis can be put in terms of indifference curve diagrams.
In Figure 2, the household is shown originally at an optimum position
7 - receiving M, dollars in market income and spending H, hours on
household production - with the household's utility maximized at level
u0. If, as a result of the accident, no hours of household production can
be performed, the household will be at point M1, maximizing the amount
of money income produced and received. Corresponding to this point
M1 is a lower welfare or utility level, U0-1. The minimum compensation
sum (called the compensating variation in income) required in order to
restore the household to its original level of utility is given by the vertical
distance MM 2 (point M2 lies on the same household indifference curve
as point z0). Thus, MM 2 is the minimum sum necessary to leave the
household's total net benefits, or net value, from household production
unchanged. The compensation sum M1M 2 is, therefore, equal to the amount
OVPJ in Figure 1.23
23 It is assumed here that there are no income effects so that the indifference curves U0
and u0, are vertically parallel and the demand curve wi in Figure 1 is Hicksian.
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0 H, H, Hours of Household
Production
Figure 2
As argued earlier, the replacement cost method is unreliable; it will
probably lead to an overestimation of the welfare loss from household
production because it ignores changes in welfare. An illustration of such
an overcompensation is provided in Figure 2a.
R2  R,
Figure 2a
N Hours of Production0 J
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The household originally provides itself with OR, hours of household
production and enjoys a level of net benefits, or welfare, equal to ovPJ.
Assume that after an accident OR1 hours of previously performed services
are lost. The household's marginal cost curve becomes vertical and equal
to ov. However, if the lost household services can be replaced by hired
help at wage rate w, then the household's marginal cost curve becomes
OWe. Given this new marginal cost curve, the household will buy OR2
hours of household production from a replacement. In doing so, the
household reaps a surplus of wvs2 . This surplus is the welfare production
after the accident. Because the household originally enjoyed a much
larger welfare equal to ovPJ, the household suffers a welfare loss equal
to OVPJ-WVS2, or OWS2PJ. Therefore, the amount of compensation required
to restore the household to its original welfare is OWS2PJ. The replacement
value approach will, however, ignore the reduction in the number of
hours of household production demanded by the same household following
the accident and will estimate the change in welfare, or welfare loss,
as being equal to OWS1 R,. This results in an overcompensation by the
amount S2SP + PJR1.
Consider a more realistic example in which some household pro-
duction is possible following the disability or death of a family member
who normally provides these services. Some of the household services
will now be performed by other household members with higher marginal
opportunity costs for each hour of services performed. This is illustrated
in Figures 3 and 4.
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Prior to the accident, the household enjoys a level of net benefits
equal to OVPJ with OR, hours of household production (Figure 3). After
the accident, the marginal cost curve is steeper (MC2), indicating higher
opportunity costs for every hour spent on household production - the
result of some other household member with greater earnings potential
having to perform some of these services. Household production would
decrease. This is reflected in the reduction in total hours worked at home
from OR, to OR2. The net value from having OR2 amount of household
production is OvYJ. The loss in welfare is thus OVPJ-OVYJ, or Jyp. This
area, JYP, represents the amount, or value, of the loss in household
production arising from wrongful death. It is the compensation required
to restore the welfare of the household to its original level, OVPJ.
In Figure 4, the household's initial level of welfare is shown to be
Uo, with H, hours of household production. After the accident, the
household's transformation frontier curve shifts downwards and to the
left, indicating the lower maximum amounts of both household production
and market income that the household can now expect to receive. This
is shown as a shift from MoH o to M3H3. With new marginal cost (MC,
to MC2 in Figure 3), the household now optimizes its welfare with H 4
hours of household production such that H4 < H,; but with H4 hours of
household production, the household enjoys a lower level of welfare,
U°-1. As before, the amount of compensation required to restore the
household to its original level of welfare is the vertical distance MIM 2.
Alternatively, since the indifference curves are vertically parallel, the
household, by producing H4 hours of household services after the accident,
would require CZ, (equal to M1M2) amount of compensation in order












0 H4  H, H, Ho Hours of Household
Figure 4 Production
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In summary, the correct measure of the welfare that the household
derives from having household production is the net value that accrues
to the household. A reduction in net value resulting from a wrongful
death causes a change in the welfare level of the household. This being
the case, the measure of the reduction in welfare from household
production is given by the amount of net value lost. In terms of welfare
economics, such welfare changes are measured by the compensating
variation income measure. The compensating variation is defined as that
sum for which
W*2(Y27,....) + CV 12 = W*,(Y,,Z,....
where W*, and W* 2 are the alternative states of welfare such that w*2
< w*,; Y, and Y, measure the market income of the household in the
two alternative states; z, and z2 represent vectors of household com-
modities in the two welfare states; and CV, 2 is the compensating variation
income from welfare state 1 to welfare state 2. Since w*2 < w*1, CV12
would be positive, indicating that a sum is to be received by the household
in order to restore its welfare to w*1.
V. CONCLUSION
The valuation of household production has always troubled the courts
because, unlike market activities, which carry money remuneration, there
is no comparable scale of value established for non-market activities.
Methods of compensation such as the replacement cost or opportunity
cost methods are flawed and may lead to significant biases. Given the
increasing importance being attached to estimates of the quantity and
economic value of household production in policy formation and in
litigation, there would appear to be a need for appraisals that would
yield accurate and appropriate valuations.
It is argued here that the appropriate measure (for the purpose of
compensating the household seeking damages in tort) of economic welfare
from household production is given by the total net value of the household's
previous production. It has been established that this measure corresponds
to the area that lies underneath the household's demand curve for
household production and above its marginal cost curve (or supply
curve) - subject to errors due to welfare effects over the range at issue.
Thus, any change in welfare arising from the wrongful death of a person
providing household services requires that this amount of lost net value
be restored to the household. This amount, called the compensating
variation, is of course difficult to estimate, but it is not impossible.
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One possible technique of estimation, recently applied to household
production, called the contingent evaluation method, asks respondents
in a survey to indicate either a willingness to pay or compensation
demanded for some hypothetical contingency. 24 The individual, in making
his or her response, will evaluate the prospective sacrifices and gains
in welfare resulting from the realization of each contingency. The
contingent evaluation method, which is commonly used to reveal non-
market values in the resource economics literature, appears to be
successful in revealing the non-market value of household production.
A further problem arises when the total amount of household
production lost, measured in time, is introduced into the analysis. Estimates
of welfare derived from household production over some period of time
must, of course, be applied to the amount of production time lost. If,
for example, the use of the contingent evaluation method, or any other
method, reveals that the estimated average net value from household
production is $4.00 per hour and that the loss of household production
from a wrongful death of a person providing household services is, say,
five hours per week; then a weekly compensation sum of $20.00
($4.00 x 5) is required to maintain the pre-tort level of household welfare.
Of course, the total compensation sum should be reduced to the present
cash value by using the appropriate discount formula taking into account
the period over which compensation should be paid.
Note that the lost example made use of an estimated average of
net value from household production. Strictly speaking, in theory, the
correct amount of compensation for such cases involving welfare loss
is given by the amount of total net value lost by individual households;
but for practical purposes, the average of households' total net value
would suffice. Just as courts have awarded compensation on the basis
of the average value of the market replacement for household production,
so the method advocated here awards compensation on the basis of the
average total net value of such production. However, the method proposed
here has a definite advantage over existing methods of estimating this
loss in that this method is consistent with welfare theory, specifically
the measurement of welfare changes. Welfare theory enables one to derive
the measurement which best conforms to the stated judicial purpose of
compensation. As E.J. Mishan puts it: "[I]t is more important to be
measuring the right thing in a crude sort of way than to be measuring
the wrong thing with impressive refinement."25
24 E. Quah and J. Knetsch, "The Economic Value of Time Devoted to Household Production:
An Alternate Measure Using the Household's Evaluation" (Simon Fraser University, 1982) [un-
published]; andE. Quah,"Valuing Family Household Production: A Contingent Evaluation Approach"
(1987) 19 Applied Econ. 875.
25 EJ. Mishan, "The ABC of Cost-Benefit" (1971) 101 Lloyds Bank Review 12 at 15.
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The purpose of this paper has been to consider the appropriate
measure for compensation for the loss of household services. It has been
shown that the implementation of the legal rule of compensation can
best be applied with the aid of economic theory. There will likely be
a continuing interest in obtaining an accurate assessment of damages
in wrongful death actions. This is an area where the joint contribution
of lawyers and economists would be of benefit.

